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Abstract
In this paper we use a novel approach to address issues of endogeneity
in estimating a causal effect of leverage on risk taking by banks. Using
data on local bank office deposits and local unemployment we construct
an instrument to use in a regression of leverage on a measure of risk taking
constructed from new issuance of loans. The results (i.) confirm that due to
limited liability banks increase their risk taking after an exogenous increase
in leverage, and (ii.) that an increase in deposit supply has a direct positive
effect on risk taking by banks.
JEL Codes: G11, G20, G21, G28
1 Introduction
There are two established, opposing theoretical results about the effect of lever-
age on risk taking by banks. First, due to limited liability expected returns on
equity investment increase with an increased riskiness of the portfolio. Because
a bank’s equity holders are protected from the left tail of the returns to assets
distribution by limited liability, they have an incentive to increase the variance of
the distribution by taking on more risk. On the other hand callable demand de-
posits constitute a substantial part of bank debt. On average, almost 20 percent of
∗We are thankful to Juan Dolado, Ramon Marimon and all the participants to various semi-
nars at EUI for useful comments and suggestions. All the remaining errors are ours.
†European University Institute
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these are above the amount insured by the Federal deposit insurance corporation.
This provides depositors with a strong incentive and tools to monitor and punish
excessive risk taking.
There is inconclusive empirical evidence on which of the two results prevails.
Our aim is to estimate a causal effect of leverage on risk taking behaviour of
banks. In doing so we add to the literature by proposing two novel approaches to
addressing the issues of endogeneity.
We identify two sources of endogeneity and propose a method to address them.
First, an increase in leverage incentivises banks to pursue riskier investment, but
at the same time the demand and supply of deposits are also affected by the banks
risk taking, giving rise to the issue of reverse causality. Second, shocks, observable
or non-observable, common to both assets and liabilities of a bank, if omitted, can
cause a bias in the estimate of the effect of leverage on risk taking.
We conduct our empirical analysis in two preliminary stages and a final stage.
In the first preliminary stage we address the issue of reverse causality by making
use of bank office level data on deposits for US banks and geographically granular
unemployment data. We argue that local unemployment rates are exogenous to
the risk taking of a bank’s headquarter and construct an instrument, an exposure
to deposit supply shocks caused by changes in local unemployment rate, to use in
the final stage regression of leverage on risk. However, as is often the case in the
empirical literature, if risk taking is approximated by using a performance measure
of existing portfolios, the issue of omitted shocks, which are common to both assets
and liabilities, remains. To address this, we construct a measure of risk taking
on newly issued mortgage loans. We argue that, while the existing portfolio of a
bank can be affected by geographical area specific shocks which affect deposits and
leverage, newly issued loans are chosen by banks after the shocks have occurred.
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Therefore the riskiness of the new portfolio is a choice by the bank.
Several results are worth highlighting. First, our final stage confirms that limited
liability induces banks to take on more risk after an exogenous increase in leverage.
This result is robust across two different instruments. Second, the deposit supply
shocks have a direct positive effect on risk taking. When banks face an increased
deposit supply, the monitoring power of the marginal depositor decreases, leaving
banks with more freedom to invest into a risky asset.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section two provides the review
of relevant literature, sections three and four explain the methodology and the
data. Section five presents the results. The concluding section five discusses the
policy implications of the findings.
2 Literature Review
There are several theoretical papers on how banks’ funding structure should impact
their risk taking. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that for a firm the decision
to take on debt is equivalent to buying a call option from its creditors. When the
debt is due, they can either choose to redeem the bond (buy back the firm) or not
to. Since the value of such an option is increasing in volatility (see for example
Black and Scholes (1973)), firms have an interest to take on higher amount of risk
than without debt financing. On the other hand, as Laeven and Levine (2009)
point out, requiring banks to hold more capital may not necessarily reduce these
incentives if this capital is raised by issuing equity to new shareholders. Simply
adding more shareholders with the same incentives may not actually alleviate the
issue. Instead, shareholders may decide to make up for the higher cost of capital
by taking on even more risky projects in the spirit of Koehn and Santomero
(1980). Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that demand deposits can have
a disciplining effect on banks. Our paper hopes to contribute to these discussions
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by providing a well-identified answer about the causal effect of leverage on risk
taking.
In the empirical literature, there are two ways that previous work has tried to
answer the question of how leverage impacts bank risk taking. The first strain of
papers attempts identification through a direct regression of a measure of leverage
on some measure of risk. Altunbas et al. (2007) aim to identify the relationship
between leverage and risk by means of a seemingly unrelated regression design
that relates changes in capital and risk. They use loan-loss provisions as a proxy
for the risk taken on by the bank and find that in their whole sample, banks
with a higher equity to asset ratio will take on more risk, while the relationship
is negative for the most efficient banks in the sample. Jacques and Nigro (1997)
employ an approach that uses a regulatory pressure variable to identify the effect
of leverage on risk, but can not refute the null hypothesis that leverage has no
effect on risk taking. Koudstaal and van Wijnbergen (2012) aim to identify the
effect of leverage on risk by regressing the standard deviation of returns on assets
on lagged leverage while controlling for market volatility. They find that higher
leverage leads to less risk taking, but that this result is entirely driven by low
leverage banks. Highly leveraged banks, they find do not react to changes in
leverage. Similarly to the above paper, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find that banks
take on more risk when there is a positive shock to capital by using a simulataneous
regression framework. As we will argue in or methodological section below, all
these papers have shortcomings in two ways: first, they fail to provide a convincing
identification in the sense that leverage cannot be seen as exogenous in any of the
above models. Second, as all the papers emply some measure of portfolio risk, they
consider a rather noisy measure of risk taking which is also impacted by market
conditions, which may in turn be impacting banks leverage decisions.
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The second strain of papers in the literature attemps to provide exogenous
variation to leverage by evaluating the effect of policies that impact banks ability
to leverage out. Laeven and Levine (2009) find that requiring banks with an owner
that holds a significant voting share to hold more capital has the effect of reducing
risk taking, while the opposite is true for widely held banks. Acosta Smith et al.
(2017) find that the introduction of the leverage ratio requirements in the Basel
III framework did cause banks to increase their capital holdings and reduce their
risk taking. Finally, Ashraf et al. (2016) showed that the introduction of risk
weighted capital standards led to a reduction of bank portfolio risk in Pakistan.
We add to the empirical literature by providing clean identification of the causal
effect of leverage on risk taking, both by adding a new instrument for leverage
and by using a measure of risk taking (a banks decision to issue certain loans)
that is much less likely to be subject to outside influences than the portfolio
based measure currently used in the literature. While these papers suffer from the
endogeneity associated with leverage to a much smaller degree, we believe that
our identification is superior as we do not need to rely on the assumption that
banks did not react to news or rumors of potential policy changes prior to the
implementation of the reform. Additionally, all of these papers rely once more
on portfolio based measures of risk, while the present work employs a much more
direct measure of risk taking.
Methodologically, our paper is related to a paper by Bartik (1993) that employs
local industry shares to identify the impact of labour supply on wages. This
approach has been recently formalized and discussed by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2017).
3 Methodology
In this section we explain the endogeneity issues we have encountered in the
analysis of leverage and risk taking, as well as our methodology to tackle them.
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Before diving deeper into those issues, there are two terms we will be using with
an important distinction between the two. First, we will use the term risk tak-
ing (behaviour) as an act of making new investment (issuing new loans) with
different degree of riskiness attached to it. This is also the subject of our analysis.
It is important to distinguish it from the term riskiness of the portfolio. This
is defined by the riskiness attached to loans which have been issued in the past.
Variation in riskiness of the portfolio can be caused by both risk taking behaviour
and by current and past shocks absorbed by the portfolio. Although the riskiness
of the portfolio is often used to proxy risk taking behaviour in the literature, the
distinction will be important in understanding the issue of endogeneity and our
identification.
We identify two sources of endogeneity which prevent a causal interpretation of
simple regression of leverage on some commonly used measure of riskiness of the
portfolio.
• Simultaneity/reverse causality: For a given level of equity, more deposits in-
centivise banks to riskier investment, but the demand and supply of deposits
are also affected by the riskiness of the portfolio and a bank’s risk taking
behavior.
• Omitted shocks common to the portfolio and the deposits.
To tackle the first source of endogeneity we use data on deposits at the office
level. The detailed geographical information on deposits enables us to compute
bank exposure to local unemployment variation which we use as an instrument to
assuring exogenous variation in leverage. This measure can still be endogenous
if the measure of risk relies on the existing portfolio. If some exogenous shocks
to economic activity occur, they are likely not only to affect the deposits (and
leverage) through unemployment but also the riskiness of the existing portfolio. To
tackle this issue, we construct a measure of risk taking based on the new issuance
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of mortgage loans. We argue that while riskiness of the portfolio is affected by
some shocks which are common to both deposits and assets, new issuances are a
choice for banks.
In accordance with the procedure described above, we estimate the effects in
two preliminary stages and a final estimation stage. In the two preliminary stages
we (i.) construct an instrument to assure variation in leverage independent of risk
taking and (ii.) construct a measure of risk taking based on newly issued mortgage
loans. All the stages are explained in more detail after the data is presented and
discussed.
3.1 Data
There are four main sources of data we use in the analysis, the bank-office level
deposit data from the FDIC, and the local unemployment data from the Bureau
of Labour Statistics for the first preliminary stage; the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act data on mortgage applications from the FFIEC for the second preliminary
stage, and finally to we add balance sheet data from the FDIC in the final stage.
3.1.1 Summary of deposits (FDIC)
Summary of deposits data is yearly data on level of deposits at the bank office
level. For every office for every bank operating in the US and insured by the
FDIC, the level of deposits as of 31st of June is reported. Along with the deposit
level data, the data contains detailed geographical and demographic information
of every office and of the bank. The basic financial information for each bank
which is added to the data is aligned with the balance sheet data, which is used
in the final stage.
For the purpose of our analysis, the data for every bank is collapsed to a relevant
geographical area level. In our case we will be using the Core Based Statistical
Areas. A Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) consists of one or more counties (or
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equivalents) anchored by an urban center of at least 10,000 people plus adjacent
counties that are socioeconomically tied to the urban center by commuting. Not
all counties are a part of a CBSA. Around 10% of all observations come from
counties which are not part of any CBSAs and the hold around 5% of all deposits.
We compile these counties at the state level into CBSA equivalents and brand
them as rural state areas. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics from the
Summary of Deposits data.
Table 1: Office Data - Summary Statistics
Year
Dep. per
office (mil.)
Dep. per
bank (mil.)
# of banks
(thous.)
# of offices
(thous.)
Avg. offices
per bank
1999 44.88 188.98 10.4 68.7 6.6
2000 46.83 211.48 10.1 70.2 6.9
2001 50.26 225.29 9.8 71.1 7.3
2002 53.20 251.07 9.5 72.1 7.6
2003 58.46 280.02 9.3 78.6 8.5
2004 60.87 292.87 9.1 80.5 8.9
2005 64.47 317.24 8.9 82.1 9.3
2006 68.07 338.86 8.8 84.6 9.7
2007 68.90 365.22 8.6 87.3 10.1
2008 70.85 362.78 8.4 89.1 10.6
2009 75.94 377.62 8.2 91.9 11.2
2010 77.92 408.69 7.8 91.7 11.7
2011 84.01 458.97 7.5 98.2 13.1
2012 91.92 525.68 7.3 97.3 13.4
2013 97.92 564.01 7.0 96.3 13.9
2014 106.76 600.78 6.7 94.7 14.2
2015 114.27 660.67 6.4 93.3 14.7
3.1.2 Local area unemployment statistics (BLS)
Local area unemployment statistics provide monthly data on unemployment at the
county level. Since the relevant geographical area in the first preliminary stage is
the CBSA, we aggregate the statistics to the CBSA level at yearly frequency. Fig-
ure 3.1.2 plots the mean and the median value of average monthly unemployment
rate of the CBSAs in the US within our sample period.
8
Figure 1: Mean and median average monthly unemployment rate of the CBSAs
in the US
3.1.3 Home mortgage disclosure act data (FFIEC)
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) obliges banks above a set thresh-
old of assets to report on mortgage applications, lending and purchases. The
reporting is done through the Loan Application Registries (LAR) and includes
all mortgage loan applications within a year. Moreover, the registries contain
the properties of the applicant and potential co-applicant (ethnicity, race, gender,
income), the loan properties (amount, type, purpose, rate spread for some, oc-
cupancy), the properties of the property (type, census tract, etc.), the properties
of the census tract (income relative to the MSA, minority population, number
of housing unites, etc.), and the action taken (origination, denial and its reason,
purchase by an institution like Freddie Mac).
Our construction of the measure of risk taking loosely follows DellAriccia et al.
(2012) and relies on the Loan to Income ratio. The loan to income ratio is com-
puted as the total loan amount in the application over the total gross annual
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income an institution relied upon in making the credit decision1. To add to the
methodology on a measure of risk taking we also use the data on origination. We
define origination as an application which has been accepted and then either orig-
inated or refused by the applicant, a purchase of a loan, or a preapproved request.
We define a non-origination as an application denied by the bank or a denied pre-
request. We ignore all applications withdrawn by the applicants or applications
closed for incompleteness.
The LAR data reports all applications, accepted or rejected. Table 2 provides
the statistics on the origination ratio between 2004 and 2012. The share of orig-
inated loan applications decreased from 74% in 2004 to 67% in 2007. In 2009,
the origination ratio increased sharply and then gradually increased to 80% in
2012. The sharp increase reflects the crisis, which has decreased the demand for
loans and forced the worse potential borrowers out of the market. The remaining
pool was of higher quality which increased banks willingness to lend to remaining
applicants.
Table 2: Acceptance ratio
2004 .744
2005 .729
2006 .715
2007 .677
2008 .681
2009 .767
2010 .776
2011 .766
2012 .794
1Gross annual income is not registered in HMDA due to four possible reasons: (i.) multifamily
dwellings, (ii.) income was not registered in the loan purchase documentation, (iii.) loans to
bank employees, (iv.) loans to non natural persons. These cases are excluded from the estimation
as described in the methodology section
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Table 3 reports the shares of prevailing reasons for rejecting a loan. Insufficient
collateral, high debt-to-income and poor credit history explain the bulk of the
rejection decisions. The effect of the crisis is evident in the spike of the share of
rejections due to insufficient collateral in 2009 when house prices collapsed.
Table 3: Reason for denial
DtI Empl. hist. Cred. hist. Collateral Downpayment Info1 Info2 Insurance Other
2004 .131 .010 .299 .113 .0154 .0357 .100 .001 .295
2005 .122 .0111 .267 .122 .012 .051 .103 .001 .311
2006 .150 .0129 .284 .154 .017 .050 .101 .001 .229
2007 .173 .0123 .272 .193 .017 .056 .119 .001 .156
2008 .205 .0114 .265 .250 .018 .044 .0934 .003 .109
2009 .227 .0129 .209 .310 .020 .037 .0779 .004 .101
2010 .222 .0134 .202 .252 .021 .036 .117 .002 .133
2011 .214 .013 .223 .241 .021 .036 .132 .002 .116
2012 .213 .013 .233 .218 .024 .043 .139 .002 .117
On top of the loan application data, the LAR reports also the information about
the loans purchased by banks. Tables 4 to 5 provide the statistics about the char-
acteristics of all applications, the accepted applications, the rejected applications
and the purchased loans.
If Loan-to-Income ratio, summarised in table 4, is taken as a relevant measure
of riskiness of a loan, the purchased loans are consistently the riskier group of
loans, while as expectedly the rejected loans are riskier than the accepted ones.
As it is somewhat counterintuitive to consider purchased loans as riskier than the
rejected ones, we can also use income as a measure of risk. As is evident in table 5,
income of borrowers whose application was accepted is higher than the income of
borrowers whose loans banks have purchased. As expected the income of potential
borrowers whose application was rejected is the lowest.
3.1.4 Balance sheet data (FDIC)
To construct the leverage measure of banks, we use balance sheet data provided by
the FDIC. The data is available at quarterly level and includes income statements
as well as several performance ratios.
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Table 4: Loan-to-Income ratio
All Accepted Rejected Purchased
mean p50 mean p50 mean p50 mean p50
2004 2.274 2.083 2.227 2.103 2.408 2.000 2.502 2.390
2005 2.281 2.098 2.217 2.106 2.452 2.077 2.480 2.400
2006 2.188 1.974 2.109 1.951 2.385 2.038 2.322 2.233
2008 2.304 2.098 2.184 2.059 2.553 2.200 2.547 2.451
2008 2.433 2.209 2.311 2.174 2.687 2.300 2.735 2.607
2009 2.573 2.243 2.420 2.211 3.060 2.372 2.539 2.427
2010 2.430 2.139 2.309 2.115 2.846 2.244 2.673 2.540
2011 2.349 2.023 2.222 2.000 2.761 2.083 2.587 2.435
2012 2.384 2.054 2.291 2.051 2.735 2.065 2.573 2.409
3.2 First stage: obtaining exogenous variation in deposits
The aim of the first preliminary stage is to construct an instrument to assure
that the variation in leverage is independent of risk taking. We do so in two ways:
i) estimating shocks to local deposits caused by unemployment changes which
we then aggregate for each bank computing the weighted average of these local
shocks; ii) or directly computing the weighted average of unemployment changes
and using this as an instrument for leverage.
To this end we use data on deposits at the bank-office level, administered by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Local Area Unemployment
Statistics administered by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. The first dataset
contains yearly information on the level of deposits for all offices of all banks
insured by the FDIC, together with the demographic information on the office
and the bank which owns it. The second dataset provides monthly unemployment
figures at county level. The relevant geographical definition in our analysis is the
Core based statistical area2.
2A Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) consists of one or more counties (or equivalents)
anchored by an urban center of at least 10,000 people plus adjacent counties that are socioeco-
nomically tied to the urban center by commuting. Not all counties are a part of a CBSA. Around
10% of all observations come from counties which are not part of any CBSAs and the hold around
5% of all deposits. We compile these counties at the state level into CBSA equivalents and brand
them as rural state areas.
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The rationale behind these instruments for bank level deposit growth rates
follows closely Bartik (1993), whose approach has been extensively analysed in
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017). The standard idea behind this approach is that
when one is interested in a parameter, say the elasticity of labour supply, using
changes in wages and employment growth rates at local level, one should be con-
cerned with the endogeneity of local employment growth. To solve this issue, the
Bartik approach suggests to define an instrument as the local employment growth
predicted by interacting local industry employment shares with national industry
employment growth rates.
In our setting we follow a similar logic but we apply it to a different level of
granularity of the data. Our potentially endogenous object is the deposit growth
rate of banks. We therefore build as an instrument the predicted change in deposits
for a bank in a given period as the interaction between the bank’s geographical
area deposit share and the change in deposits in the geographical area.
We do so in two different ways to avoid any further endogeneity concern or
feedback loop between bank and area level deposit changes: i) we predict the
change in deposits in a geographical area in a given period based on the change of
local unemployment in that period and use this fitted value as our instrument; ii)
we use the change in unemployment in the geographical area directly (not using
it to predict deposits) as the instrument.
Before discussing the two approaches in further detail, key differences between
our strategy and the standard Bartik instruments should be highlighted. As men-
tioned above, the literature employs this approach to solve endogeneity problems.
In contrast, we use the geographical area shares as a mean of aggregation, not
as a solution to endogeneity per se. We adopt as instrumental variables for the
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leverage the “relevant” changes in local unemployment or deposit supply, where
“relevant” is to be read as weighted by geographical area deposit composition.
The adoption of of this specific aggregation strategy serves two distinct purposes:
first and foremost is an appealing way of aggregating geographical area specific
changes to the bank level; second it eliminates any further endogeneity concerns.
The two approaches are formalized below.
Instrumenting deposits: In the first method we regress the growth rate of
total deposits in a geographical area on the change in the local unemployment
rate. We brand the fitted values from this model at the geographical area level as
shocks to deposit supply at the geographical area level. For each bank in each year
we then compute the exposure to this variation in deposit supply as a weighted
average of these shocks using the deposits each bank holds in a particular area as
weights. This implies the following procedure,
∆depi,t = α0 + γi + ηt + β∆unempi,t + i,t (1)
where ∆depi,t denotes the growth rate of deposits in a geographical area i in period
t, γi and ηt denote geographical area and time fixed effects, and ∆unempi,t denotes
a change in unemployment rate in geographical area i in period t. We call the
fitted values from the model above local shocks to deposit supply. To compute
the exposure of a particular bank in a particular period to these shocks, which
would serve as an instrument for leverage in our final estimation, we compute the
weighted average of these shocks for every bank, where then we use the deposit
this particular bank holds in different areas as weights. For bank b, operating in
areas i = 1..I, this implies:
∆ ˆdepb,t =
∑I
i=1 depb,i,t∆
ˆdepi,t∑I
i=1 depb,i,t
(2)
where depb,i,t denotes the deposits bank b holds in geographical area i in period
t. We use the measure ∆ ˆdepb,t as one of the possible instruments in the final
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estimation of the effect of leverage on risk taking.
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results for equation 1. Results, as expected,
prove a negative and highly significant effect of changes in unemployment on
deposit growth rates at the CBSA level. An increase in unemployment change in
a CBSA by one percentage point decreases the deposit growth rate in that area
by 0.43 percentage points after controlling for the CBSA and year fixed effects.
Table 5: Regression table: First preliminary stage
(1)
∆ln(deposits)
∆unemp -0.432∗∗∗
(0.117)
constant 0.0310∗∗∗
Time FE YES
CBSA FE YES
N 21450
R2 0.014
adj. R2 -0.034
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 2 plots the mean of the bank level deposit supply shock, ˆdepj,t across
time. The figure also depicts a sharp drop in deposit supply caused by a spike in
unemployment across the US.
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Figure 2: Mean bank level deposit supply shock
Direct local unemployment exposure: In the alternative method we di-
rectly estimate the exposure of each bank to changes in local unemployment rates,
using, as before, the deposits a bank holds as weights. For bank b, operating in
areas i = 1..I, this exposure, ∆expb,t, is given by:
∆expb,t =
∑I
i=1 depb,i,t∆unempi,t∑I
i=1 depb,i,t
(3)
where, as before, depb,i,t denotes the deposits bank j holds in geographical area i in
period t, and ∆unempi,t denotes a change in unemployment rate in geographical
area i in period t. We use ∆expb,t as the second instrument in the final estima-
tion of the effect of leverage on risk taking. Figure 3 plots the mean bank level
exposure to unemployment.
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Figure 3: Mean bank level exposure to local unemployment changes
The two instrument exploit the same variation of changes in unemployment at
the local level. They are not numerically equivalent due to different specifications
(of the fixed effects). It is also worth noting that the second instrument does not
require any estimation since it is only built through aggregation of local areas
changes at the bank level. This is relevant because one may be concerned that our
first instrument may suffer from generated regressor problems. As we will show
later we obtain almost identical results with the two instruments.
3.3 Second stage: creating a measure of risk taking
3.3.1 Remaining endogeneity
The procedure explained above describes constructing a measure of an exoge-
nous change in deposits and a measure of an exposure of banks to changes in
local unemployment rates. Both these measures are exogenous to risk taking, but
not exogenous to a measure of riskiness of the portfolio. To exemplify the issue,
consider a shock to deposits in a certain area as estimated in the previous section.
Such a shock is likely to impact the income of depositors. It cannot however be
excluded to have impacted also the borrowers, private or corporate, in an area,
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which may or may not have borrowed from the banks operating in that areas. Any
measure of risk, which is based on the performance of the existing portfolio might
be subject to this sort of residual endogeneity.
New issuances of loans are not subject to this endogeneity concern since new
issuances can only be affected by the existing pool of potential loans. A geograph-
ical area shock can affect the existing local pool of borrowers, however it does not
affect the entire pool of potential borrowers. New issuance of a loan is a choice
for a bank and the riskiness of new issuances proxies risk taking behaviour.
3.3.2 Creating a measure of risk taking
To this end we construct a measure of risk taking based on the issuances of new
mortgage loans based on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset, ad-
ministered by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
It is a yearly dataset on the population of mortgage applications to banks and
other mortgage lenders with detailed information on the borrower and loan char-
acteristics. We take the riskiness of new mortgage lending as representative of risk
taking on the entire portfolio.
To construct a measure of risk taking behaviour by banks, we estimate the re-
sponsiveness of loan issuance of each bank in each year to riskiness of the borrower
and the loan. As a measure of riskiness of the loan and the borrower we use the
Loan-to-Income (LtI) ratio computed from the HMDA dataset for every loan ap-
plication. This follows loosely DellAriccia et al. (2012), where LtI is used directly
as a measure of risk in their analysis of lending standards. Our methodology
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implies the following model34.
Origint,b,j = γ
0
t + γ
1
t,bLtIt,b,j + t,b,j (4)
where Origint,b,j denotes a binary loan origination variable which takes the value
Origint,b,j = 1 if the application in period t to a bank b by a borrower j is ac-
cepted and loan is originated, and takes the value Origint,b,j = 0 if the application
is rejected and the loan is not originated. γ0t captures the effect of the macroeco-
nomic situation in period t for all banks, such as market liquidity and regulation.
Finally, for every bank b in every period t we also obtain an estimate of the risk
responsiveness γ1t,b based on Loan-to-Income of all applicants j from 1 to J , which
serves as a measure of risk taking behavior by banks.
Figure 4 plots the risk measure for the banks included in the analysis over the
years. The distribution has a mean of 0,038 with a standard deviation of 0.129.
Figure 4: Distribution of the risk measure to LtI
3In order for γ0t to capture the macroeconomic conditions affecting the origination choices,
we estimate the model for all banks reporting to the HMDA dataset but only use the γ1t,i for
banks included in the final regressions. This implies including all the loan applications in the
HMDA reporting in the estimations. The number varies between 17 million applications and 40
million application which constrains us to estimating the model as a linear probability model.
4This measure is joint work with Lo´pez-Quiles and Petricek (2018)
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3.4 Final stage: the effect of leverage on risk taking
In the final stage we use the two instruments, explained in detail above, to es-
timate the effect of leverage on risk taking. As argued before the instrumented
deposits and the direct measure of exposure to local unemployment shocks are
exogenous to risk taking. The instruments allow us to estimate two effects: (i.)
the effect of the two instruments on leverage, and (ii.)the effect of leverage on risk
taking.
More specifically we run the following two specifications:
γˆb,t = β0 + β1levb,t + ηj + δt + bt (5)
Where levbt is the endogenous variable, ηb are bank fixed effects and ηt are time
fixed effects. This equation is estimated by IV, where the endogenous variable levbt
is instrumented with one of the two instruments: either ∆ ˆdepbt or ∆expbt, depend-
ing on the model. It is also estimated by OLS, in order to compare the coefficients
of interest.
To investigate the direct effect of an exogenous change in deposits on risk
taking behaviour we estimate
γˆb,t = β0 + β1∆ ˆdepbt + ηb + δt + bt (6)
An alternative model for equation (6), in which exposure to local unemploy-
ment shocks is used instead of exogenous deposits, is considered too.
The results of the estimations are presented and discussed in the next section.
4 Results
Table 6 presents the results of the estimations for both instruments. Column (1)
shows the biased OLS estimate of regressing the risk taking measure on leverage.
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Columns (3) and (4) present the results using the exposure to changes in unem-
ployment as an instrument, while columns (6) and (7) present the deposit supply
shocks as an instrument. Columns (3) and (6) show the first stage of the two IV
regressions, while Columns (4) and (7) show the second stage. Columns (2) and
(5) display the direct effect of the unemployment IV and the deposit growth IV
on the risk measure. Both sets of results are consistent both in terms of sign and
numerically, so we will focus on the latter in explaining them. All standard errors
are clustered at the bank level.
First we find that the naive OLS approach severely underestimates the effect
of leverage on risk taking behaviour, the result is one order of magnitude lower
than the IV estimation outcome. This bias may go some way towards explaining
findings in the previous literature that leverage leads to less risk taking, or has no
effect (see for example Altunbas et al. (2007) and Jacques and Nigro (1997)).
Second we find that an increase in deposit supply leads to higher risk taking by
banks. A possible explanation for this result is that when deposit supply increases
the monitoring power of the marginal depositor decreases, allowing banks to take
on more risk. Alternatively one can think of a “shadow price of risk” story, mean-
ing that the expected cost of taking on more risk decreases in an environment
where the deposit supply is larger. Finally, and most importantly, all our results
provide convincing evidence for the narrative of a positive effect of leverage on
banks’ risk taking due to limited liabilities.
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Table 6: Regression table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS IV-S1 IV-S2 OLS IV-S1 IV-S2
Risk Measure Risk Measure Leverage Risk Measure Risk Measure Leverage Risk Measure
Leverage 0.000467∗∗ 0.00874∗∗ 0.00802∗∗
(0.000158) (0.00284) (0.00268)
IV ∆ Unemployment -0.108∗∗ -12.37∗∗∗
(0.0376) (1.424)
IV ∆ Deposits 0.230∗∗ 28.63∗∗∗
(0.0852) (3.107)
Constant 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 6.378∗∗∗ -0.0116 0.0390∗∗∗ 5.742∗∗∗ -0.00707
(0.00130) (0.000830) (0.0344) (0.0182) (0.00213) (0.0802) (0.0172)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 71702 71540 71539 71539 71540 71539 71539
R2 0.105 0.104 0.066 0.104 0.066
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.104 0.066 0.104 0.066
Bank clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We also investigated the possibility of nonlinear effects of leverage on risk
taking by running our IV regression through 2SLS and interacting the predicted
endogenous variable with dummmies denoting different deciles of the leverage
distribution. We found no significant pattern in the estimation and that most
coefficient on these dummies are not statistically significant. The takeaway of this
analysis is that the effect of leverage in our data does not significantly vary along
the distribution.
Quantitatively our results state that a one point increase in leverage generates
an .008 increase in our risk taking measure. The mean of the risk measure in
our data is .03, which implies that a one point increase in leverage produces a
26% increase risk taking when compared to the average. For a specific example,
assume that two banks are identical except for their leverage ratios, which differ
by one point. Assume that they receive the same application for a mortgage loan
with average Loan-to-Income. Our estimates suggest that this application has an
expected probability of being originated in the bank with the lower leverage of
γ0 +γiLTI whereas the expected probability of origination for the more leveraged
bank is γ0 + (γi + .008)LTI. Evaluating these probabilities at the average of our
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estimates and at the average loan-to-income we obtain that the more leveraged
bank has a 3% higher probability of originating the loan. Note also that this wedge
between the probabilities of acceptance increases with loan-to-income. Meaning
that the higher the loan-to-income of the applicant the larger the difference in
expected acceptance probabilities between the more and less leveraged bank.
Our results have policy relevant implications in terms of the aggregate level
of risk in the banking system. The estimations show that more levered banks
are more likely to take on riskier projects due to limited liability incentives which
implies that curbing leverage has the added benefit of reducing banks’ risk taking,
thereby producing a more resilient banking system.
In recent years a new trend of modelling banks as deposit creators has risen.
In this view banks are not constrained by the supply of deposits since deposits are
created upon loan origination. The relevant constraint for banks then becomes
the availability of investment opportunities. In a world in which in which there
is no deposit supply, but only loan demand, all our results carry through with a
different interpretation. Namely what we have denoted throughout this paper as
a deposit supply shock should then be reinterpreted as an exogenous change in
funding demand by entrepreneurs. This is consistent since in such a world any
observed deposit is just an originated loan. Our results would then suggest that
as loan demand exogenously increases banks take on riskier projects.
5 Conclusions
This paper addresses the question of the causal effect of exogenous changes in lever-
age on banks’ risk taking behaviour. We do so by constructing a set of instruments
to overcome the endogeneity problems resulting from the potential simultaneity
and reverse causality between risk decisions and the deposit market conditions.
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We instrument exogenous changes in the leverage by building two instruments: i)
one based on the geographical area unemployment changes; ii) one based on the
geographical area deposit supply changes. In both cases we aggregate them using
the local deposit share of banks.
We then build a new measure of risk taking behaviour based on the respon-
siveness of origination decisions to a measure of risk of loan applications (loan-
to-income). We compute this measure at the bank/year level and use it as our
outcome.
Our empirical analysis suggests that exogenous increases in leverage incentivise
banks to take on more risk, i.e. to originate loans with higher loan-to-income. This
result is consistent with a limited liability and moral hazard story put forth by
some of the theoretical literature. This result is novel in the empirical literature on
leverage and risk taking, as previous works have found no relation or a negative
relationship between leverage and risk. Furthermore, we find that exogenously
increased deposit supply allows banks to take on more risk. These results have
relevant policy implications in that they suggest that any measure that would
reduce banks’ leverage would also decrease incentives to invest in risky assets,
thereby considerably reducing systemic risk.
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